

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA		✓		
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACIS		✓		
21	NID/NPS		✓		
22					

SUSPENSE _____
Date _____

Remarks:

STAT

/ Executive Secretary


10/3/82

Date

3637 (10-81)

NSA Review Completed.


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



October 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

JOHN H. STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense


Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

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GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOSEPH PRESEL
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

TERESA COLLINS
Chief, Secretariat Staff
Executive Secretariat
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Guidance for Administration Speakers on the
Nuclear Referenda

The attached guidance has been approved for use by Administration speakers on various nuclear freeze referenda. Please disseminate as appropriate.


Staff Secretary

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Attachment

As stated



L287

Guidance for Speakers on the Administration's Position
on the Nuclear Freeze Resolution

Q: What is the Administration's position on the various referenda (this state's referendum) calling for a freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons?

A: The Administration shares the concern being expressed by Americans in many parts of the country about the danger of nuclear war and the high levels of nuclear weapons that exist. Like each of his predecessors since World War II, the President is fully committed to reducing the risk of nuclear war. He has proposed a series of bold arms reduction initiatives, and we are now negotiating with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons.

We recognize that the nuclear freeze proposal represents a desire to achieve rapid progress in arms control. To the extent that these freeze resolutions and referenda represent an expression of concern by the American people, we share that sentiment, but we do not believe that a freeze at current levels is an effective or sound approach to arms control.

A freeze at current levels would not be in our national interest for the following reasons:

-- A freeze at current levels would seriously handicap our efforts to negotiate arms reductions because it would lock in existing Soviet military advantages, and prevent us from carrying out

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necessary modernization of our nuclear forces. It would thus reduce Soviet incentives to discuss seriously proposals for cuts in nuclear arsenals.

- Because all aspects of a freeze could not now be effectively verified -- and some might not be verifiable at all -- we would have to spend a great deal of time and effort negotiating more extensive verification measures. The time and effort spent negotiating such measures could be better spent negotiating reductions and verification for them.
- Although a freeze appears simple, because of its broad coverage, it would require extensive and lengthy negotiations to agree on the terms. This would divert us from the task of seeking reductions.
- We can do better than a freeze.
- Our arms control proposals go beyond a freeze to seek substantial reductions in nuclear arms. In the START negotiations we are proposing one-third reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. In the INF negotiations, we are proposing the complete elimination of a whole class of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. These proposals would go a long way toward promoting stability and achieving the goals on which we all agree -- reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both the US and USSR in a

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manner that enhances the prospects for security and reduces the risk of war.